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Radical right-wing populist parties have experienced a growth in support in several European
countries over the last 15 years, but how do such parties adapt to power when they enter
government? Tjitske Akkerman, Sarah de Lange and Matthijs Rooduijn write that although
radical right-wing populist parties do become more mainstream in some respects when they enter
office, this is largely only true in a procedural sense, with their policy platforms quickly becoming
just as radical as before when they go back into opposition.
Radical right-wing populist parties are an increasingly important factor almost everywhere in
western Europe. On average, the electoral support for these parties in national elections has grown
by 4.5 percentage points since the 1990s. Moreover, many radical right-wing populist parties, such
as the Freedom Party of Austria  (FPŐ) and Italy’s Lega Nord (LN), have participated in government
coalitions. Others, such as the Danish People’s Party (DF) and the Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV),
have been supporters of minority cabinets and have as such been part of a governing coalition.
When the current cabinets in Finland and Norway are included, radical right-wing populist parties
have participated in no less than 16 government coalitions since the turn of the century.
It can be expected that experience in government induces radical right-wing populist parties to shift
toward the mainstream. Being in office in western Europe almost always entails being part of a
coalition with one or more mainstream parties and therefore will pressure parties to compromise. It
is also more difficult for parties to position themselves as outsiders and opponents of the
establishment, an essential trait of radical right-wing populist parties. Indeed, previous research
shows that other new party families, like the greens or religious parties, become more mainstream
when they prepare to assume government responsibility. There are no reasons to suppose that this will be different
for radical right-wing populist parties.
Yet, we find that radical right-wing populist parties generally do not mainstream when they govern. Based on
quantitative comparative analyses and on a wide range of qualitative case studies, our recent book demonstrates
that governing radical right-wing populist parties hardly compromise on core issues, such as immigration and Islam,
law and order, or European integration. Moreover, we observe that they maintain a niche profile, only marginally
broadening their focus to socioeconomic issues.
Furthermore, we found that radical right-wing populist parties do not tone down their populist rhetoric when in office.
The only important mainstreaming effect that can be observed is behavioural. We find that most radical right-wing
populist parties become less populist in terms of their parliamentary behaviour. More specifically, they behave as
trustworthy partners in the coalitions they form and follow the rules of the political game. However, this effect is
temporary, and the parties we assessed ‘radicalised’ when returning to the opposition benches.
The case of the Freedom Party of Austria
The case of the FPŐ, one of the first radical right-wing populist parties to enter a national government in 2000,
illustrates these findings. At first glance, the party seemed to mainstream after assuming office. It met the demands
of the conservative coalition partner, the ŐVP, in order to gain national office, such as abandoning its stances on
plebiscitarian democracy and European integration, and distancing itself from associations with Nazism. Moreover,
with respect to immigration and integration policy, the new cabinet did not deviate much from previous cabinets.
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When the government coalition assumed office in 2000, ŐVP-leader Schȕssel had declared that ‘he would tame the
dragon’ and initially the FPŐ indeed seemed to be ‘tamed’.
However, in government, tensions quickly developed
within the FPŐ due to the pressures of slumping support
in the polls and discontent over the party strategy
among the rank and file. As a result, the party split
shortly after it had assumed office for a second time in
2005, with a new party, the Alliance for the Future of
Austria (BZŐ) staying in the government, while the
breakaway FPŐ returned to the opposition benches.
Once in opposition, the FPŐ soon radicalised again to
regain support among voters disaffected with
government policies. Its new leader, Heinz-Christian
Strache, ferociously attacked the government’s EU and
immigration policies, accusing the EU of corruption and
of being seized by ‘asylum craziness’. In the
subsequent elections, the FPŐ fared much better than
the BZŐ. After the next Austrian elections, which are
scheduled to be held before October 2018, it even is
likely the FPŐ will become the largest party in the
country. However, it is unlikely the FPŐ will repeat
history and adapt to the demands of its eventual partner(s), as it has learned that it pays to give priority to votes
rather than office.
Avoiding the mainstream
In sum, we find that radical right-wing populist parties do not mainstream when preparing for office. They have
learned that watering down their radical right-wing populist profile is electorally costly and they therefore refrain from
mainstreaming. Only when it comes to their populist behaviour does government participation have an impact. While
populist rhetoric thrives when radical right-wing populist parties are in office, they do not act accordingly when they
have government responsibility.
The DF and the PVV, for instance, demonstrated from the beginning that they were trustworthy partners to the
minority cabinet they were supporting. The DF supported the government budget every year and seldom opposed
government bills. The party has become quite ‘housetrained’ in this respect, a qualification that is illustrated by the
fact that even the Social Democrats supported the election of former DF-leader Kjaersgaard as Speaker of
Parliament.
Of course, there are also exceptions to these general rules. The Finns Party in Finland, for instance, made
concessions with respect to its Euroscepticism by accepting the Greek bailout when it assumed office in 2015. Yet
most parties have found ways to minimize compromising on their core issues, like immigration and integration, law
and order and European integration when concluding coalition agreements. An important way through which they
have achieved this objective is by logrolling over policy. In exchange for concessions on immigration and integration
policies, for instance, radical right-wing populist parties accept the socioeconomic reforms their partners want to
implement.
The DF engaged in this strategy most successfully, thereby fundamentally reshaping immigration and integration
legislation in Denmark. Another way to maintain a radical right-wing populist profile is through the inclusion of
‘agreements to disagree’ in the coalition agreement. The DF and the PVV protected the possibility to campaign on
their anti-Islam positions by excluding this issue from the coalition agreement. Lastly, forms of direct democracy are
2/3
also exploited to maintain a radical right-wing populist profile when in government. The Swiss People’s Party (SVP)
in particular has demonstrated how popular initiatives and referendums can be used to circumvent constraints of
office in this respect.
In sum, radical right-wing populist parties do what they can to maintain their profitable profile and thereby maintain
voter support when in office. With the help of the strategies described above they manage quite well to stay away
from the mainstream and to keep a radical right-wing populist profile, even when confronted with the responsibilities
that come with governing.
For a more detailed account of the research project, see the authors’ book Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties in
Western Europe. Into the Mainstream? (London: Routledge, 2016)
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